Lions Bay Search & Rescue Task Report:

                 Brian Jackman Search on Mount Seymour.
                     Wednesday, January 30th 1993.


Lions Bay Search & Rescue was notified at approximately 1700 hrs on 
Tuesday, January 29th 1993, that their assistance would be required 
by the North Shore Rescue in the ongoing search for Brian Jackman on 
Mount Seymour. A full call-out of the Lions Bay team members was 
initiated that evening for an 0900 hr start on Mount Seymour the 
following morning.

I (Martin Colwell) arrived at the NSR 'Rescue 1' mobile base in the 
Mount Seymour parking Lot at approximately 
0830 hrs on January 30th, to help prepare for the arrival of team 
members and to help expedite the despatching of our search teams 
into the field. It was immediately obvious that a large-scale search 
was beginning, with many search teams, friends of the missing person 
and walk-in volunteers arriving at the search base. There was a 
large media presence, with three or four television stations, as 
well as  many radio and newspaper reporters in attendance.

I was immediately requested by Al Danks, the Search Manager, and 
Dave Brewer, assistant Search Manager, to help with the assembly and 
despatch of search teams. In consultation with Al Danks we prepared 
field assignments. I then interviewed all the walk-in volunteers and 
assigned them, as appropriate, with experienced searchers to various 
field tasks. With so many searchers present this task continued, 
without any break, for nearly four hours. Soon after midday we had 
approximately 50 searchers in the field, in 12-15 search teams. The 
Lions Bay team members were generally given the more challenging 
tasks, including the Dog Mountain and Boulder Creek regions. Having 
a large supply of local maps, or at least copies, on hand for each 
team is important, as routes and search areas can be clearly marked 
at the time of each teams briefing. This avoids possible confusion 
as to the teams specific task.

When all the teams were despatched to the field the reserve of 
radios fell quite low, to the point that we had to canvass the 
vehicles and team members for units. It also appears that there were 
not enough avalanche beacons for every searcher. Snowshoes had to be 
borrowed from the rental shop.
	
The primary approach of the Search Manager was to 'sign cut' large 
areas of the mountain to determine if Brian Jackman had passed 
through the area. As no snow had fallen for approximately a week 
this aided the preservation of tracks. Unfortunately this was also 
the week of the post-Christmas holidays and so tracks were quite 
numerous from the many people who had been on the mountain during 
the week. Many tracks from previous searchers, as well as the 
public, were present, indicating the importance of careful 
de-briefing of the specific routes taken by the search teams.

At approximately 1230 hrs the Lions Bay/North Shore Team of Ken & 
Eric More located and followed tracks in the direction of Dog 
Mountain. At first no more importance was attached to this set of 
tracks than any others but when they were followed into a gully 
region it was felt that they may be the tracks of the missing person.

Al Danks and I decided that we should investigate this clue more 
closely and re-deploy more search teams into the slopes and 
drainages of the Dog Mountain region. Our use of media helicopters 
was restricted by their budget restraints and the RCMP helicopter 
was being used to fly the FLIR, with no room for additional 
spotters. We requested to PEP (Provincial Emergency Program) that we 
be authorized to fly into the Dog Mountain region to seek-out 
prospective landing sites for the additional search teams, as well 
as to confirm the location of the many teams, who were scattered 
throughout the slopes in that region of the mountain. (The Lions Bay 
team in the vicinity of Boulder Gully had a broken altimeter and 
were somewhat unclear of their location). 

Dave Brewer and I flew around the south and when west sides of Dog 
Mountain. We saw a team in the Boulder Gully area fire off a red 
flare in an attempt to pinpoint their location. We then approached 
the West face of Dog Mountain and were attempting to find the Lions 
Bay Team who were believed to be near the suumit region. As we 
approached the West Face gullies we decided to move in closer, to 
check for teams or tracks in that area. The southern-most gully was 
fairly broad and easy to search. No signs were found. The gullies to 
the north, which culminate in the drainage of Suicide Gully, were 
quite numerous, narrow and similar in appearance, with cliffs and 
steep forest between them. As we approached the second gully to the 
north (travelling from south to north) a small 'dot' of yellow was 
observed beneath tree branches at a narrow point in th gully.
	
As we moved in very close to the face, this image resolved into 
human form; a person who was standing up and waving vigorously. We 
assumed at first that he was a member of one of the search teams in 
the Dog Mountain region. Our attempts to make radio contact with the 
individual were unsuccesful and then we noticed that there were no 
other team members close by. I then remembered the clothing 
description written down at Rescue 1 and realized that it matched 
that of the missing person, Brian Jackman. (The clothing worn was 
similar to that of a number of his work-friends I had interviewed, 
who were also assisting on the mountain). We moved in closer and 
indicated to Jackman that we had found him. We then searched the 
region for a suitable landing site but found none. Due to the depth 
and narrowness of the gully, and its recessed position in the face, 
we were unsure if a helicopter hoist would be feasible. We then 
re-searched from the gully bottom upwards and found a snow pocket in 
the gully on which we could just 'toe-in' the front runners of the 
'copter, about 50-100m below Jackman. As, at this time. he appeared 
fairly healthy we felt that he could probably be brought down to 
this site for evacuation. (The pilot felt that 442 Squadron would 
not be able to lower a person down that deeply into the gully).

We attempted to pinpoint Jackman's position by elevation. However 
there were no other distinct landmarks in the area, nor was taking 
compass bearings feasible in the helicopter.  A Global Positioning 
System, to pinpoint both Jackman and our team members, would have 
been a great asset. As we returned to the parking lot I noticed some 
light clouds drifting towards the face and was concerned that a 
helicopter drop-off and rescue might be impossible if the gullies 
became clouded in. At this time we recommended that 442 Squadron 
should be called in to assist with the rescue. 

Because of the concave shape of the face, and the recessed nature of 
the gully, I believe that ground-search teams would not have been 
able, at any time, to have made a visual contact with the subject. 
Sound contact may also have been unlikely for the same reason. 
Sending search teams into the very steep, avalanche prone gullies 
would have been both dangerous and logistically impractical, given 
the limited availability of skilled manpower,and the large number of 
gullies on that face. There is no doubt in my mind that 
air-searching, by helicopter, was the only practical way to find 
Brian Jackman. 

A great many helicopters (perhaps 4 to 6) were following our 
movements and as soon as we left the site they moved in to take 
video footage of Jackman. Upon returning to the parking lot two 
climbers were enlisted to  stabilize and assist in the rescue of the 
subject. With Dave Brewer as spotter, they returned to the snow 
pocket in the gully, where they disembarked and then climbed up to 
Brian Jackman. They proceeded with the stabilization and first-aid 
while 442 Squadron were flying the Labrador in from Comox. 

At this time all other team members in the field were instructed to 
begin their return to Base. When the Labrador landed in the parking 
lot I was instructed to fly with them to guide them to the rescue 
site.

We flew past the gully on the first pass and returned when Suicide 
Gully came into view. After some deliberation I felt we had found 
the right gully. Even when we moved in very close, with six people 
watching the hillside, it was quite  difficult to spot Jackman and 
the rescue team. At this time I counted four other helicopters in 
the air and one on the ground in the valley bottom. The helicopters 
appeared to be acting in a professional manner and gave us 
reasonable clearance.

Due to the narrowness of the gully forward helicopter movement was 
very slow, a few feet at a time in any direction, with many 
corrections for dead-heads and other trees close by. The two 
Sartech's were then winched down to a point approximately 30m below 
the subject. Upon assesment of the subject the Stokes stretcher was 
lowered and Brian Jackman placed inside. During this time we 
reversed out of the gully and then circled in a holding pattern. We 
returned and began winching in the stretcher, which had a nylon 
guide-line connected to the ground team. 

As the stretcher approached the body of the Labrador it begain 
spinning, slowly at first and then alarmingly fast. The hoisting was 
immediately halted and then recommenced once the spinning had 
stopped. Once the stretcher was level with the floor of the 'Lab we 
attempted to pull it in. However it would not budge, with two of us 
pulling on it. After a number of attempts the 'copter was lowered a 
few feet. I believe this took tension off the guide-line to the 
ground, as we then managed to pull the stretcher in. The Sartech's 
had felt that Jackman's condition was serious enough that he should 
be transported without delay to medical aid. Therefore once the 
Sartechs were winched on-board the two climbers were left behind in 
the gully and the patient evacuation begun. 

Brian Jackman appeard to be suffering from right shoulder and right 
leg injuries. He was holding his right arm in an arched manner, so 
we stabilized it in this position. We then put a metal leg brace on 
his right leg, to maintain the limb in the position found. He was 
conscious the whole time and quite lucid. While we were stabilizing 
the patient the 'Lab flew higher up Dog Mountain and winched up the 
Lions Bay/North Shore team members (Ken & Eric More) from the top of 
the gully system. We periodically took Jackman's pulse and recorded 
personal information while we flew to the Harbour Centre landing 
site. From there EHS transported him to St. Pauls Hosipital. The 
time was approximately 1700 hrs.

By now it was dark and the two rescue climbers remained in the gully 
on Dog Mountain. The pilot of the Labrador explained that it was not 
normal practise to fly back into a difficult location, such as the 
gully at night. Rescue 1 and I were concerned about leaving the 
climbers on the mountain all night, especially in a steep gully. The 
pilot phoned her C/O to request permission to make a pick-up. 
Permission was granted, so after re-fuelling we flew back to the 
parking lot, dropped off the other team members and then returned to 
Dog Mountain. Again we over-shot the gully in the dark, even with a 
very powerful searchlight trained on the face. A small flare from 
the rescue team was spotted and we returned to the correct location 
on the mountain.

The pick-up location was too close to the face of the mountain, even 
when we nosed into position. The climbers moved down the slope until 
we could just lower the winch above them. A Sartech dropped down the 
winch and picked up the two climbers without any further incident. 
We returned to the parking lot and disembarked. By this time 
(aproxiamtely 1900hrs) all teams had returned from the field and the 
media had left.

This search leads to a few recommendations for future consideration.

1.   Air-searching by helicopter is the only practical way to search 
large areas of steep mountain faces and gullies in the winter. 
Failure to do so promptly could very easily cost someone their life.

2.   A Global Positioning System would be a very useful tool to 
permit the accurate location of missing persons when they are found, 
or for re-directing search teams who are 'unsure of their location'.

3.   The large number of helicopters flying through the search zone 
(One Labrador, 2 RCMP and perhaps 4-6 media 'copters) gives rise to 
the possibility of 'near misses' in the air. Although all those 
present appeared to fly responsibility four or five 'copters in the 
air at once could pose a risk. Perhaps some form of Air Traffic 
Control or informal procedural agreement could be arranged. 

4.   A pool of SAR management resource equipment, such as 
photocopiers, faxes, PC's and cellular phones would be a useful 
asset on a large search. Supplies of critical field equipment, such 
as radios, maps, snowshoes, avalanche beacons and avalanche probes 
were also in short (or no) supply.


Prepared by M. Colwell.  21st January 1993.

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